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Expectation of Clearance

Expectation of Clearance

Expectation of Clearance

Expectation of Clearance

Expectation of Clearance

Description

Many situations in air traffic control are repetitive and result in pilots expecting that a particular clearance will be given, because:

Hazards

If clearance is given that differs from the expected clearance, the pilot may read back the clearance correctly but perform the expected clearance.

Alternatively, the pilot may read back the expected clearance, but the error may not be noticed by the ATCO.

Typical Scenarios

Related Accidents and Incidents

 

B738, Eindhoven Netherlands, 2012

On 11 October 2012, the crew of a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 did not change frequency to TWR when instructed to do so by GND whilst already backtracking the departure runway and then made a 180° turn and took off without clearance still on GND frequency.

Whilst no actual loss of ground or airborne safety resulted, the Investigation found that when the Captain had queried the receipt of a take-off clearance with the First Officer, he had received and accepted a hesitant confirmation.

Crew non-compliance with related AIP ground maneuvering restrictions replicated in their airport briefing was also noted.

DH8B, Kangerlussuaq Greenland, 2017

On 2 March 2017, a DHC8-200 took off from Kangerlussuaq in normal day visibility without clearance and almost immediately overflew three snow clearance vehicles on the runway.

The investigation identified several likely contributory factors including a one-hour departure delay which the crew was keen to reduce to remain within their maximum allowable duty period and their inability to initially see the vehicles because of the runway downslope.

No evidence of crew fatigue was found; it was noted that the vehicles involved had been in contact with TWR on a separate frequency using the local language.

B738/A319 en-route, southeast of Zurich Switzerland, 2013

On 12 April 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 took a climb clearance intended for another Ryanair aircraft on the same frequency.

The aircraft for which the clearance was intended did not respond and the controller did not notice that the clearance readback had come from a different aircraft.

Once the wrong aircraft began to climb, from FL360 to FL380, a TCAS RA descent occurred due to traffic just being transferred to a different frequency and at FL370.

That traffic received a TCAS RA to climb. STCA was activated at the ATS Unit controlling both Ryanair aircraft.

AT43/A346, Zurich Switzerland, 2010

On 18 June 2010, an ATR 42 began daylight take-off on runway 28 at Zurich without ATC clearance at the same time as an A340 began to take off from intersecting runway 16 with an ATC clearance.

ATC was unaware of this until alerted to the situation by the crew of another aircraft that was waiting to take off from runway 28, after which the ATR 42 was immediately instructed to stop and did so before the runway intersection whilst the A340 continued departure on runway 16.

B744 / MD90, New Chitose Japan, 2008

On 16 February 2008, during daylight and in poor visibility, a Boeing 747-400, operated by Japan Airlines, was holding on a taxiway next to runway 01R of New Chitose Airport, Japan.

A Douglas MD-90-30 operated by the same airline landed on the same runway and was still on the runway when the B747 was cleared to line up and wait.

Shortly after the lineup, the B747 began its takeoff roll without receiving such clearance and subsequently was instructed to abort the takeoff. The crew of the B747 successfully rejected the takeoff.

Contributory Factors

Solutions

Related Articles

Read more:

Clearances for Departing and Arriving Aircraft

Communication Failure: Guidance for Controllers

Call-sign Confusion

Blocked Transmissions / Undetected Simultaneous Transmissions (USiT)

VFR Guidance Material

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